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This study proposes the adoption of money growth rules as indicator variables of monetary 
policies by the countries converging to a common currency system, in particular, by the 
eurozone candidate countries.  The analytical framework assumes an inflation target as the 
ultimate policy goal.  The converging countries act in essence as “takers” of the inflation 
target, which, in this case, is the eurozone’s inflation forecast.  The study advances a forward-
looking money growth model that might be applied to aid monetary convergence to the 
eurozone.  However, feasibility of adopting money growth rules depends on stable 
relationships between money and target variables, which are low inflation and stable 
exchange rate.  Long-run interactions between these variables are examined for Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic by employing a Johansen cointegration test, along with 
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 I.  Introduction 
 
Following the May 2004 accession to the European Union (EU), the new member states 
(NMS) face a task of devising an appropriate monetary policy regime for a successful future 
convergence to the eurozone. Therefore, during the post-accession period NMS need to  
properly select policy goals, optimal indicator variables and instruments
2. 
 
  The literature on the subject of optimal monetary policy regimes for convergence to 
the eurozone has not presented a clear consensus about most effective venues of convergence.  
A gradualist approach to convergence suggests an interim policy based on direct inflation 
targeting (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003, as well as Orlowski, 2001 and 2003) or on flexible 
exchange rate targeting (Bofinger and Wollmershäuser, 2001 and 2002).  A contrary view is 
presented by the proponents of an early unilateral euroization (Begg et.al., 2001).  Due to the 
lack of uniformity about policy targets, little attention has been devoted to selecting 
appropriate indicator variables that would serve as a basis for monitoring the actual progress 
of monetary convergence.  Instead, most of the analytical papers have focused on the 
Maastricht criteria that are in essence formulated as purely numerical benchmarks for the final 
stage of convergence rather than as dynamic measures of its progress.  
 
  The analytical framework of this paper assumes inflation targets as ultimate policy 
goals.  Specific inflation targets for the converging economies are presumed to be identical 
with the eurozone inflation target, thus the converging countries are perceived as ‘target-
takers’. In this way, they need to follow strategies facilitating a smooth entry to the common 
currency block. However, in order to monitor the speed and the degree of advancement of 
monetary convergence, they need to adopt appropriate indicator variables.  Such variables 
may include a declining path of inflation risk premia (i.e. excess real interest rates over those 
prevailing in the eurosystem), decreasing exchange rate risk premia, money growth rates, or 
deviations of inflation forecasts from the inflation target.   
 
  This paper examines feasibility of adopting money growth rules in the converging 
countries. It is an extension of my earlier study (Orlowski, 2003), which discussed 
conditionality of adopting inflation risk and exchange rate risk premia as indicator variables 
for economies converging to the eurozone.  The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that 
policy-makers in NMS may consider incorporating money growth rules into the operational 
framework of monetary regimes, even though such rules have been recently rather unpopular 
and seemingly absent from strategies applied by the leading industrial countries.    Money-
based monetary policies seem to have merit for the advanced transition countries as the 
previously derailed link between money, inflation and income growth appears to be now 
gradually restored.  Reasonable money growth rules might serve two purposes for these 
countries – (1) they help inject liquidity sufficient for a sustained economic growth, and (2) 
they might serve as a policy anchor defending these economies from renewed inflation 
expectations.   
 
                                                
2 A comprehensive macroeconomic policy framework based on goals, indicator and instrument variables was 
originally proposed by Tinbergen (1956). The search for optimal indicator variables of monetary policy has been 
recently revived by a number of studies including Svensson and Woodford (2000) who examine optimal weights 
on such variables in partial information, forward-looking models under policy discretion and commitment.  
However, unlike Svensson and Woodford who assign meaningful weights to output stability, this paper 
prioritizes exclusively inflation targets.  A policy framework assigning a strong weight on inflation targets is 
believed to be more appropriate for accomplishing a successful monetary convergence to a common currency 
system, and to the eurozone in particular.      3 
  In principle, money growth rules might be applied in the presence of a stable dynamic 
relationship between money growth and changes in policy target variables, such as output 
growth, inflation and variability of exchange rates.  Although such dynamic stability is 
unlikely in the pre-EU accession period due to the prevalence of transition-related processes, 
such as the growing monetization coupled with disinflation, reasonable money growth targets 
can be determined in the post-accession period.     
 
  Section II of the paper presents a model outlining dynamic, permanent interactions 
between money velocity and the opportunity cost of holding money that reflect transition-
related process of increasing monetization  and evolving financial intermediation in these 
economies.  These dynamic changes ultimately lead to a more stable relationship between 
money and output, which should enable policy-makers to devise realistic money growth 
targets.  Empirical evidence supporting these interactions is provided for Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic - the three largest NMS.  A two-country model outlining a specific money 
growth formula for the converging economies is presented in Section III.  Section IV 
investigates feasibility of adoption of money-based rules depending on co-movements 
between medium-range money, inflation rates and exchange rates, by employing the Johansen 
cointegration tests for the three selected countries.  Section V presents a summary of key 
findings and policy recommendations.  
 
 
II.  Money Neutrality and the Transition Process 
 
The economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe had to overcome the command 
economy conditions where a financial system played a passive role and was insulated from 
economic decision-making.  Under such conditions, money did not perform its normal 
functions; it served as a unit of account, but hardly as a measure or a store of value.  National 
currencies were not convertible on either current or capital account transactions.  
Consequently, monetization of these economies was rather low; but the stable money stock in 
combination with the prices of the majority of goods and services fixed at extremely low 
levels led to a sizeable monetary overhang (Bruno, 1992).  At the initial stage of transition, 
most of the governments enacted a comprehensive price liberalization that led to a rapid 
erasure of the monetary overhang and a one-time, corrective high inflation.  The initial 
episode of misalignment between money growth and inflation c ould be perceived as a 
transitory shock that lasted no longer than two to three quarters and had a diverse magnitude 
depending upon the scope of the initial price fixing and the depth of price liberalization 
(Fischer, Sahay and Végh, 2002).   
 
  The initial distortion to a stable relationship between money and income has no 
bearing on more permanent transition-related processes that affect present monetary policy 
strategies and tactics in these economies. For this reason, the early shock is not embedded in 
the dynamic model of interactions between money velocity and the opportunity cost of 
holding money that is presented in this section. In essence, the model disregards any 
transitory shocks to this relationship and takes into consideration permanent, transition-related 
factors, including growing financial intermediation, the overall development of modern 
financial markets and, in general terms, a ‘catching-up’ monetization process of these 
economies. 
 
  The interactions between money velocity and the opportunity cost of holding money 
that correspond with the transition-related dynamic structural and institutional processes are 
shown in Figure 1.   The opportunity cost of holding money is defined here as a difference   4 
between market interest rates (for instance, three months Treasury bill rates) and bank deposit 
rates. Under theoretical assumptions, velocity of money generally increases with a rising 
difference between market rates and deposit rates, thus velocity of money and the opportunity 
cost of holding money are directly related.  Higher market interest rates tend to lower demand 
for money as individuals move their assets into interest-bearing instruments. The decreasing 
money balances at a given level of income result in a higher money velocity
3.   
 
….. insert Figure 1 around here ….. 
 
  Point A on Figure 1 denotes an initial process of economic transition.  At this early 
stage, the degree of monetization remains low, thus money velocity tends to be high 
(disregarding possible distortions stemming from corrective inflation).  At the same time, 
monetary authorities apply high interest rates in order to contain inflation.  In the environment 
of an insufficiently competitive banking system, bank deposit rates are considerably lower 
than market interest rates. 
 
  As the process of monetization evolves and the banking system becomes more 
developed and competitive, velocity declines and the deposit rates rise relative to market 
interest rates driving down the opportunity cost of holding money.  These transition-related 
tendencies move a combination of money velocity and the opportunity cost of money to point 
B.   Subsequently, as the transition progresses to a more developed stage, money balances and 
bank competitiveness reach more stable levels.  At the advanced stage, financial institutions 
engage in competitive games by furthering technology and introducing new products 
(electronic banking, credit card emission, etc.) and by bringing deposit rate closer to market 
interest rates level (assuming that bank deposit rates are not fixed by government regulation).  
These advances labeled in Figure 1 as financial system efficiency improvements (FSEI) are 
likely to raise money velocity while a bank competition increase (BCI) is likely to reduce the 
opportunity cost of holding money.  The interplay between both variables settles at point C.  
At this most advanced stage, the transition economies are expected to gain a stable velocity of 
money, which enables them to follow more closely a monetarist link between money and 
income growth.   
 
  In reality, the dynamic interactions between money velocity and the differential 
between market rates and bank deposit rates is unlikely to be as straightforward as implied by 
Figure 1.  To reiterate, the outlined model reflects only dynamic institutional processes related 
to economic transition, while the practical experience of Central and East European countries 
implicates the occurrence of strong transitory shocks.  These shocks include: the initial 
corrective inflation, contagion effects of international financial crises, or monetary regime 
switching, all of which have caused distortions to money velocity and the opportunity cost of 
holding money.  As an example, the international financial crisis of 1997 and, to a lesser 
extent, the Russian financial crisis of August/September 1998 exerted upward pressures on 
market interest rates, particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Moreover, the changes 
in monetary policy regimes, i.e. the departure from exchange-rate-based policies and the 
adoption of inflation targeting in the Czech Republic (January 1998), Poland (January 1999) 
and Hungary (June 2001), raised the opportunity cost of holding money relative to money 
velocity (as clearly evidenced by data in Table 1). 
 
…..  insert Table 1 around here  ….. 
 
                                                
3 A comprehensive analysis of factors affecting velocity of money can be found in Thornton (1983).   5 
  The actual experience of the three examined countries with attaining monetary 
stability is summarized in Table 1.  The data show that the degree of monetization as 
measured by the ratio of nominal M2 to GDP has advanced in Poland and the Czech 
Republic
4 during the eleven-year period 1992-2002. In Hungary this ratio was fairly high 
already at the early stage of transition.  It appears that the NMS post-EU accession strategy, 
which will be aimed at monetary convergence to the eurozone, will be likely accompanied by 
the degree of monetization roughly comparable to that prevailing in most of the industrial 
countries. It is likely to get settled within the 45-50 percent range in Poland and Hungary and 
around 75 percent in the Czech Republic.   
 
  Correspondingly with the advancement of monetization, velocity of M2 has declined 
in both the Czech Republic and Poland.  A noteworthy decline in velocity has taken place in 
these countries since the inception of monetary regimes based on direct inflation targeting.  It 
can therefore be argued that by adopting direct inflation targeting the policy-makers 
succeeded in their commitment to containing inflation, both in actual and expected terms, 
which in turn has allowed for an accelerated money growth without exerting inflationary 
pressures (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003).  As a result, velocity of M2 has steadily decreased.  A 
similar effect can be expected to take place in Hungary, although it is still too soon for 
observing a definite pattern of change in velocity since the inflation targeting regime was 
enacted there only in mid-2001.  
 
  The opportunity cost of holding money has been very unstable in all three countries.  
Toward the end of the Czech hard currency peg regime that was ultimately abandoned in May 
1997, the differential between the three months T-bill rates and the bank deposit rates reached 
a very high level reflecting the policy-makers efforts to defend the peg.  For the same reason, 
it was also high in Hungary. In response to the relaxation of the fixed exchange rates in both 
countries, the opportunity cost of holding money steadily declined by 2002.  It also decreased 
in Poland after the elimination of the crawling devaluation system in April 2000. 
  
  The income elasticity of the M2 money demand surged in the Czech Republic 
particularly on the eve of the 1997 financial crisis as the country experienced very large 
capital inflows.  International investors flocked the Czech financial markets, particularly with 
short-term capital, as they perceived the currency peg to be unsustainable (Linne, 1999; Brada 
and Kutan, 2001).  As a result, money supply showed a substantial increase so did the income 
elasticity coefficient.  In Poland, the coefficient is showing a declining tendency until the end 
of 1999 due to relatively smaller capital inflows in relation to the faster growing GDP than in 
the remaining two countries.  It shows a one-time surge in 2000, followed by a deep 
correction in 2001, reflecting dramatic changes in capital inflows. Hungary’s income 
elasticity of money demand generally exceeded unity during the 1993-1998 period (except for 
1995) proving a faster growth of M2 money than of GDP, thus a growing monetization.  
During that time, the country’s monetary regime was based on the currency peg with a narrow 
band of permitted fluctuations, accompanied by a crawling devaluation. This policy 
framework coupled with a favorable outlook for economic growth induced large capital 
inflows, which in turn accelerated the M2 growth and increased the income elasticity of 
money demand coefficient. In general, the analyzed elasticity measure has been very volatile 
and at times it exceeded unity in all three countries, implying a stronger percentage growth of 
M2 money than of the nominal GDP.  However, the recent (2000-2003) trends are more 
encouraging.  The income elasticity of money demand coefficients have all fallen below the 
                                                
4 The medium range M2 money in the Czech Republic is a considerably broader monetary aggregate than the 
M2 in Poland and Hungary.  Therefore, direct comparisons of the degree of monetization and M2 velocity 
between these countries are not plausible.   6 
unity.  They have become a bit more stable and, therefore, predictable, which is likely to 
enable policy-makers to devise fairly realistic money growth rules.  In a simplified scenario, if 
the coefficients stabilize around a 0.75 level and the inflation forecast settles around two 
percent, a four percent nominal (two percent real) GDP growth target can be associated with a 
three percent M2 money growth target, certainly assuming a full completion of the ‘catching-
up’ process of monetization. 
 
  In sum, it appears that money growth rules might be considered as important indicator 
guideposts for monetary policy framework in NMS preparing for accession to the eurozone.  
As the process of expanding monetization of NMS seems to have been completed at the 
present time, the preconditions for a feasible application of money rules, such as a stable path 
of both money velocity and income elasticity of money demand, might be in place in a near 
future.  In order to establish effective money growth rules in NMS pursuing monetary 
convergence to the eurozone, policy makers need to gain full knowledge of interactions 
between the key policy goals, namely disinflation and exchange rate stability, and dynamic 




III.  Money Growth Rule and Monetary Convergence within the Flexible Inflation 
Targeting Framework 
 
The model outlining interactions between money supply, inflation and exchange rate is based 
on the assumption that the converging economy follows a policy of flexible inflation 
targeting, i.e. it gives priority to the inflation target and assumes exchange rate stability as a 
supplemental target.   Flexible inflation targeting has been endorsed as an optimal policy 
regime for the countries converging to the eurozone by Orlowski (2001), Jonas and Mishkin 
(2003), and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). Their analytical models are based on a central 
bank reaction function showing a tradeoff between inflation and exchange rate stability, with 
a preferential weight assigned to the inflation target.
5  Their approach differs from that 
proposed by Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2001 and 2002) who favor a regime of flexible 
exchange rate targeting, which assigns a considerably stronger priority to the exchange rate 
stability. 
 
  In the model presented below, the exchange rate is determined exogenously by 
financial markets, which means  that it is fully flexible.  The countries converging to a  
common currency area, in this case the eurozone, assume the unified currency bloc forward-
looking inflation target as their own.  Thus in principle, the converging countries are viewed 
as ‘target-takers’ since they need to align the domestic policy goal with the foreign inflation 
target for their convergence to be successful.  In addition, the model is based on money 
growth as the key indicator variable of monetary policy in the converging economy. 
 
  Consistently with these assumptions, a forward-looking money targeting function is 
specified as 
 
t t t t t t m t m x u a j a m t + + + = - + 2 1 , ˆ                                               (1) 
 
                                                
5 An open-economy central bank reaction function that is based on alternative choices between inflation and 
exchange rate volatility has been pioneered by Ball (1999).   7 
The variable  t + t t m , ˆ  is the forecast of the log of money growth for  t -periods ahead, 
formulated at time t,  t m  is the steady-state money growth, while  t j  and  t u  denote 
respectively predictable and stochastic shocks to money growth path.    
 
  The money growth model can be expanded further into an open-economy framework 
that is derived from the Obstfeld-Rogoff (OR) two-country model of exchange rate 
determination (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). However, unlike in the OR, our model does not 
assume identical domestic and foreign real interest rates in order to reflect seemingly realistic 
conditions of economies converging to a large common currency system. Real interest rates in 
these economies always exceed foreign real rates denoting a higher inflation risk premium 
relative to the foreign monetary system. Therefore in the money growth model, predictable 
shocks to money are incorporated in inflation risk premia, that is the excess domestic over 
foreign real interest rates.   
 
  Domestic real money demand function is prescribed as  
 
) ˆ ( , 1 t p d + + - = - t t t t t t r c p m                                         (2) 
 
As all variables are stated in logs,  t m  reflects a percentage change in the money stock  t M ,  t p  
denotes the percentage change in the price level, and  t r  is the real interest rate. The nominal 
interest rate is   t t t t i r = + +t p , ˆ  and  b p
b d - =  . 








t p d + + - = - t t t t t t r c p m                                                     (3) 
 
In both functions, the consumption variable  t c  can be viewed in broader terms as a 
transactions variable, reflecting all transactions affecting total nominal income, and not only 
consumer demand.   
 
  Policy-makers in a converging economy need to take into consideration not only 
domestic but also foreign real money demand conditions, thus they may wish to devise a 
single money rule combining equations (2) and (3).  A possible link between both equations 
can be provided by assuming that the spot exchange rate (expressed as a log of domestic 
currency value of a foreign currency unit) strictly follows the relative purchasing power parity 
condition in a flexible exchange rate regime and a free-trade policy framework, thus 
 
*
t t t p p s - =                                                                      (4) 
 
A combination of (2), (3) and (4) allows for establishing a forward-looking, relative-to- 
abroad money growth rule that is outlined by 
 






, , t t t t p d p d + + + + + + + - - = - - t t t t t t t t t t t t t r r c c s m m              (5) 
 
As implied above, a converging country adopts the domestic inflation target that is identical 
with the foreign inflation forecast.  This identity is specified as 
   8 
*
, ˆ t p p + = t t t                                                                        (6) 
 
Taking into consideration the identity between the domestic inflation target and the foreign 
inflation forecast that under credible policy is identical with the foreign inflation target, a 
forward-looking money growth process for the economy converging to a common currency 









, , ) ( ) ( ˆ ˆ t t t t t t t t t t t s r i c c m m x g p g g g t t + + - - - - + = - + +             (7) 
 
This functional form investigates the difference between the projected domestic and foreign 
money growth rates in response to the contemporaneous change in the relative-to-abroad 
transactions variable  t c , the inflation risk premium, and the spot exchange rate.  The term 
) (
*
t t t r i - -p   denotes a relative-to-abroad inflation risk premium.  The coefficient  1 g  
measures the degree of responsiveness of the relative money growth to the differential in the 
transactions variable and it depends directly on the degree of expansion of domestic credit as 
well as on the relationship between a home versus foreign product bias.
6  A strong foreign 
product bias will increase the difference between  t c  and 
*
t c , and given the growth in domestic 
consumption being financed by credit expansion, the demand for money in future periods will 
grow at an accelerated rate, thus  1 g  will be positive.   
 
  The relationship prescribed by (7) can be interpreted as a forward-looking money 
demand function. It measures an expected change in domestic versus foreign money demand 
expressed as a function of the relative-to-abroad change in the transactions variable, the 
inflation risk premium and the exchange rate.  The inflation target is built into the inflation 
risk premium and thus the monetary convergence process implies that the domestic nominal 
interest rate is initially higher than the sum of the inflation target and the foreign real interest 
rate.  As the convergence progresses, the positive inflation risk premium is likely to disappear.  
In essence, the money rule prescribed by equation (7) is a feedback rule, as the forecast of the 
relative money growth feeds back to the policy target (built into the relative inflation risk 
premium) and is conditional upon the exchange rate.  
 
 
IV.  Co-movements between Money, Inflation and Exchange Rates 
 
  It has been widely argued in the literature that a plausible application of a money-
based policy rule depends on a stable, long-run relationship between the key components of 
money demand.  Thus an assertion can be made that the evidence of established dynamic 
interactions between real money, income, real interest rates and, in an open economy 
framework, exchange rate would allow for a safe introduction of achievable money growth 
targets
7.   
                                                
6 A noteworthy examination of the impact of a home product bias on different policy scenarios can be found in 
Warnock (2003). One can assume that the transition economies have experienced a gradual, dynamic shift from 
a foreign to a home product bias in consumption, particularly those that enacted deep economic reforms based on 
price and trade liberalization.  The initial liberalization caused an influx of superior foreign goods that have been 
gradually replaced by quality domestic products, particularly those produced by a growing number of 
subsidiaries of foreign companies.  However, the magnitude of this phenomenon deserves to be empirically 
investigated.  
7 Evaluation of a long-run dynamic relationship between the components of money demand based on 
cointegration tests was given a formal treatment in Johansen and Juselius (1990).  If such long-run relationship   9 
  It seems sensible to claim that realistic money rules shall depend on a stable 
relationship between money growth, inflation and exchange rate in the economies converging 
to a common currency system.  By assumption, policy-makers in these economies are likely 
to apply an inflation targeting regime in which domestic inflation needs to be aligned with the 
foreign inflation target and the exchange rate remains fully flexible.  Therefore, an 
introduction of a sensible money growth rule depends on a stable long-run relationship 
between money (as a policy indicator variable) and inflation, possibly supplemented with a 
stable exchange rate (viewed as target variables).  If policy-makers assign a predominant 
weight on achieving the inflation goal and allow the exchange rate to freely fluctuate, a 
plausible money rule will strictly depend on a co-movement between money and inflation.  
Under such policy conditions, other components of an open-economy money demand 
function such as output and the exchange rate can be disregarded.    
 
  It can be therefore argued that in NMS aspiring to join the eurozone, realistic money 
growth rules ought to depend on a dynamic tendency of money growth and inflation to move 
together. If time series of both variables are non-stationary but there is a long-run linear 
combination between their movements, these variables are believed to be cointegrated.  In 
addition, some attention has to be given to the co-movement of money and the exchange rate, 
because the candidate countries can be reasonably expected to converge smoothly to the 
eurozone, meaning that minimizing the volatility of the domestic currency value against the 
euro cannot be excluded as an important policy objective.  Assuming that the converging 
countries will focus their monetary policy on containing inflation and disregard a possible 
increase in output volatility, a long-run stability of all the components of money demand is 
not necessary to be achieved; specifically, it is not indispensable to have a stable relationship 
between money and output.  
 
  For the above stated reasons, the empirical section of this study examines 
cointegration between money growth, inflation and exchange rates in the three selected NMS  
by employing the Johansen trace procedure, as well as short run adjustments to the dynamic 
cointegrating relationships inspected with the vector error correction (VEC) test.  In order to 
demonstrate money growth response to the target variables of inflation and exchange rates, 
the following model specification is constructed: 
 
t t t t S M e b p b + + = 1 0                                                                                   (8) 
 
The model assumes a long-run association between the level variables of money stock, 
inflation and the spot value of the euro in national currency terms and the  t e  term denotes a 
zero mean, stationary process.  
 
  Before conducting cointegration tests for the selected variables it is necessary to 
confirm that all variables of the above model are suitable for inclusion in such tests.  It is 
because cointegration procedures by their design produce meaningful results only if the tested 
variables alone are non-stationary, but there is a stationary linear combination between them 
in the long-run. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
takes place, money targeting is in principle fully consistent with inflation targeting, as argued by von Hagen 
(1995). Cointegration tests have been applied for examination of stability of money demand in transition 
economies as well. In a noteworthy study on this subject Cziráky and Gillman (2003) examine long-run stability 
of money demand and output in Croatia.     10 
  Stationarity between money, inflation and the exchange rate in the three selected 
countries is examined by employing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  The 
estimation results are shown in Table 2.  
 
…..  insert Table 2 around here  ….. 
 
The obtained results based on the ADF  t -statistics indicate that all variables for all three 
countries are non-stationary at their levels, with the exception of Poland’s CPI inflation.  They 
become stationary when stated in their first difference terms, except for the Hungarian M2 
money stock that becomes stationary only in its second differenced term.  Interestingly, 
medium range money M2 is stationary both in Poland and the Czech Republic when stated in 
logs.  In sum, the obtained t -statistics show that it is appropriate to use the selected variables 
stated at their levels for cointegration testing since all of them are non-stationary. The 
cointegration analysis can also include Poland’s inflation, the stationarity of which does not 
appear to be very strong. 
 
  In order to assess properly the dynamic cointegrating relationships between these 
variables it is necessary to carefully choose a set of specific assumptions for the data 
generating process (DGP) for each of the three examined NMS.   Specific options for 
controlling the optimization process have been chosen after conducting a series of 
cointegration tests of money, inflation and exchange rate variables during the January 1995-
December 2003 sample period. 
8  Specifically, linear deterministic trends are included in the 
level data for Poland but not the Czech Republic and Hungary. In addition, cointegrating 
equations have intercept and no trend in all three cases, test VAR (vector auto-regression) has 
trend only in the case of Poland, up to four lag intervals are applied for Poland and Hungary, 
and only two for the Czech Republic.  Cointegration tests based on Johansen trace statistics 
are reported for these countries in Tables 3-5.  It shall be noted that Johansen maximum 
eigenvalue statistics are not shown here because their results in terms of the number of 
cointegrating vectors are identical to those implied by the trace statistics.  
 
  The results of the Johansen trace cointegration test for Poland are shown in Table 3. 
The test is aimed at identifying the number of meaningful cointegrating vectors in the model 
reflecting responses of M2 money to inflation and the Polish zloty (PLN) per euro exchange 
rate.  The number of hypothesized cointegrating equations is denoted by r. T he null 
hypotheses assume for each row of numbers: zero, at least one, and at least two cointegrating 
equations. The alternative hypothesis states one, two and three cointegrating equations 
respectively for each row. As long as trace statistics exceed critical values at five or one 
percent, the alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
 
…..   insert Table 3 around here  ….. 
 
The results from the hypothesis testing for Poland reveal that there are three cointegrating 
equations at five percent and one equation at one percent level.  When a single cointegrating 
vector (cointegrating equation) for the long-run estimation is applied, the normalized 
coefficients are given as follows: 
9 
  
                                                
8 The earlier data series are excluded because of the serious distortions of monetary indicators and trends caused 
by the policies based on hard currency pegs.  The rigid currency pegs have been relaxed in the three examined 
countries only since 1995. 
9 All estimations are obtained with EViews 4.0.   11 
t t t S M p 245 . 14 850 . 35 - - =                                                                          (9) 
(35.158)  (1.376)  
   
Asymptotic standard errors for the identified parameters are reported in parentheses.  The 
cointegrating vectors imply a significant long-run relationship between the M2 money and 
inflation, however, with a  counterintuitive opposite sign.  Without doubt, the growth of 
monetization has been coupled with disinflation in Poland during the sample period, although 
a similar inverse relationship is unlikely to hold true in the future since the process of 
‘catching up’ monetization now appears to be completed.   
 
  Similar reactions are obtained from a system of two cointegrating equations. The 
normalized coefficients reflecting a long-run relationship between money, inflation and the 
exchange rate in this case are 
t t M p 917 . 12 - =                                                                                          (10a) 
                         (0.964) 
and  
t t S p 037 . 0 - =                                                                                               (10b) 
                      (0.009) 
 
In the system of two cointegrating equations, there is a significant cointegration between the 
exchange rate and inflation, yet again, it appears to be counterintuitive.  Although both 
normalized coefficients for this model from the two cointegrating vectors are significant, their 
signs do not support a presumed long-run direct relationship between inflation and money 
supply, as well as inflation and the spot exchange rate.  The coefficients imply that 
disinflation has been coupled with money growth during the sample period, which is a special 
case attributable to the process of expanding monetization.   In addition, disinflation has been 
accompanied by the PLN depreciation (increasing  t S ) that likely stems from the system of 
crawling devaluation that prevailed in Poland until April 2000.  Moreover, the cointegrating 
vector of inflation and the exchange rate embodied in the long-run relationship (10b) seems to 
dismiss any significance of a transmission mechanism of currency depreciation into higher 
inflation. In sum, the past record of long-run interactions between these monetary variables in 
Poland does not support the endorsement of sensible money rules for monetary policy for the 
future eurozone convergence period.  
 
  Similar results are obtained from the cointegration analysis for the Czech Republic.  
The test statistics shown in Table 4 suggest that there is a single equation cointegrating M2 
money with inflation and the Czech Koruna value of the euro at both five and one percent 
critical value. The trace statistics is in fact larger than the corresponding critical values.  
  
…...   insert Table 4 around here  ….. 
 
The long-run relationship corresponding to the single cointegrating vector in the normalized 
form is estimated as 
457 . 1629 104 . 40 149 . 15 + - = t t t S M p                                                     (11) 
                       (54.055)      (29.398)    (1787.28)   12 
The interactions between the examined variables are similar to those for Poland.  The sign of 
the vector cointegrating inflation and M2 money is also negative in the Czech case, implying 
a long-run dynamic combination of disinflation and money expansion and this relationship 
appears to be significant.  In addition, the co-movement between the exchange rate and 
money is not significant, which is a bit surprising, considering the previously indicated 
exposure of the Czech financial system to large capital inflows. It shall be further noted that 
the proximity of the dynamic interactions between the tested variables in Poland and the 
Czech Republic is not surprising, considering the fact that during a larger part of the sample 
period monetary authorities of both countries have applied similar monetary policy regimes 
based on direct inflation targeting with flexible exchange rates. 
 
  A somewhat different long-run relationship between the examined variable can be 
detected from the cointegration test for Hungary.  The results of the Johansen trace test shown 
in Table 5 imply that there are two cointegrating equations at the five percent level, although 
only one is suggested at a one percent level.   
 
…..  insert Table 5 around here  ….. 
 
The single cointegrating equation is given by 
18 . 10359 249 . 253 734 . 42 + - - = t t t S M p                                                   (12) 
                          (57.551)    (213.034)    (15955.80) 
 
The relationship does not indicate meaningful, statistically significant results.  Yet a different 
message transpires from a system of two cointegrating vectors in normalized forms.  The 
corresponding long run relationships to the two-vector system are 
753 . 11 047 . 405 + - = t t M p                                                                          (13a) 
(161.924)  (3418.96) 
and 
134 . 242 552 . 3 + = t t S p                                                                                (13b) 
(2.240)  (49.293) 
 
The vector cointegrating M2 and inflation shows a dynamic inverse relationship between both 
variables, which, as in the cases of Poland and the Czech Republic, suggests a combination of 
disinflation and expanding monetization over the course of economic transition.  In addition, a 
fairly significant effect is implied by (13b). The positive sign of the vector cointegrating 
inflation and the exchange rate indicates a direct long-run relationship between both variables.  
This effect stems from a strong impact of the crawling devaluation of the Hungarian forint 
(HUF) on contemporaneous inflation and inflation expectations.  It further implies the active 
role of the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission that is based on pass-
through effects of the forint depreciation on inflation, as it has been also confirmed in the 
analysis of the Hungarian monetary policy transmission channels by Golinelli and Rovelli 
(2002).  In addition, the cointegrating relationship (13b) suggests that the implied long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate is approximately equal to 242 HUF per euro (which is a bit 
stronger than its actual value of 266 at the end of 2003).  The weaker actual rate of the HUF 
than the dynamic convergence rate is certainly understandable. The actual rate would be   13 
reduced to the implied convergence rate if inflation in Hungary was brought down to a zero 
level.  
   
  The above analysis of long-run cointegration relationships between M2 money, 
inflation and exchange rate suggest that the link between money and the two monetary policy 
target variables has been disconnected by the transition-related processes.  Nevertheless, it 
needs to be explored whether there is a dynamic short-run adjustment process that is bringing 
the fluctuations in money and inflation closer together.  An answer to this inquiry can be 
provided by the empirical analysis utilizing a VEC procedure. In general terms, a VEC model 
is a restricted VAR that is designed for testing short-run adjustment dynamics in non-
stationary series known to be cointegrated.  In this analytical exercise, a VEC model allows to 
investigate the short-run dynamics in the relationship between money, inflation and the 
exchange rate.   
 
  The main purpose of the presented VEC testing is to investigate usefulness of short-
run dynamics in M2 money movements for the assessment of the inflation process.  
Therefore, the model takes into consideration a change in CPI inflation as a function of lagged 
changes in money supply and inflation in preceding periods along with a contemporaneous 
change in the exchange rate. The DGP assumptions for the VEC test are identical for all three 
countries.  They include consideration of M2 money stock and CPI inflation as endogenous 
variables, and the spot value of the euro in national currency terms as an exogenous variable.  
In addition, endogenous variables have two lag intervals and there are no imposed 
cointegration restrictions.  Based on these assumptions, the estimated equation of the VEC 
model is specified as 
 
t t t t t t t t t S a b b M a g g M g M g a ' ) ( 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 m p p p p + + + + + D + D + D + D + = D - - - - - -   (14) 
 
The most informative component of the VEC equation is the cointegrating equation 
) ( 1 1 0 1 - - + + t t b b M p and its coefficient  1 a .  A pivotal message about the actual convergence of 
M2 money and inflation toward equilibrium is provided by the sign of the estimated  1 a  
coefficient. In a desirable policy scenario, if the parameter has a negative sign and money 
supply ‘overshoots’ the adjusted inflation in the previous period ( 1 - t M > 1 1 - t bp ), an active 
convergence of money supply toward equilibrium does in fact take place. The estimated 
value of  1 a  denotes the speed of adjustment toward equilibrium – the adjustment is faster 
when the absolute value of the coefficient is larger. 
 
  The estimation representations of the VEC test (equation 14) for the cointegrating 
equations specified above for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are shown in Table 6.  
The reported results of the short-run vector error correction to the long-run cointegrating 
relationship between M2 money, inflation and the exchange rate are meaningful.  In general 
terms, these results suggest that changes in M2 play in f act a stronger role in the 
determination of inflation within the short-run error correction process than that implied by 
the long-run cointegration.   
 
…..  insert Table 6 around here  ….. 
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  In all three cases, the negative signs of the mean of the dependent variable  p D  affirm 
a successful disinflation process.  Most importantly, the estimated error correction coefficients 
1 a  are all negative and statistically significant, although their absolute values are not very 
strong.  The negative and significant coefficients of the estimated equilibrium error 
demonstrate an active use of the error correction mechanism.  This effect is more apparent in 
The Czech Republic and Hungary than in Poland, as the statistical significance of the 
coefficient for the first two countries is greater. It can be therefore argued that the error 
correction mechanism has in fact contributed to disinflation in all three countries.  As the 
mechanism is based on a vector connecting M2 money and inflation, both lagged by one-
period, strong, positive and statistically significant b1 parameters suggest that a possible surge 
in inflation in a previous period above the level implied by the money stock clearly drives up 
the actual inflation in all three countries. 
   
  Diverse conclusions are derived from the estimated  2 a  coefficients.  In the error 
correction process, a positive value of this coefficient means that currency depreciation 
quickly adds pressure to inflation.  This is clearly the case in the Czech Republic, but in 
Poland this effect is rather ambiguous.  In contrast, the estimated value of  2 a  for Hungary is 
negative, which can be explained by a strong influence of the crawling devaluation 
mechanism that remained effective in Hungary for a larger part of the examined sample 
period.  
  
  As it could be fully expected, the predominant role in the vector error correction 
mechanism prescribed by equation (14) is played by the one-period lagged inflation.  In all 
three cases, the estimated g2 coefficients are positive and statistically significant.  Noticeably, 
the correction process of the lagged inflation takes a bit longer in the Czech Republic than in 
Hungary and Poland.  The meaningful impact lag extends in the Czech case into at least two 
periods as it is implied by the high and significant estimated value of the g3 coefficient. 
   
  In sum, the overall impact of the error correction process seems to be moderately 
acceptable for all three countries.  The estimated R
2 determination coefficients are not very 
high, although both the Akaike and the Schwartz information criteria are brought down to the 
acceptable levels.  In general terms, the error correction process shows that money is an active 
component of the VEC cointegrating equation.  Therefore, short-term fluctuations in money 
balances have some impact on changes in inflation in all three examined countries. This is 
somewhat encouraging from the standpoint of the proposition of introducing money as a 
policy indicator variable. A long-run relationship between money and policy target variables 
has not been established yet. The cointegration tests indicate that the dynamic interactions 
between money, inflation and exchange rates have been biased by the transition related 
institutional processes, such as the growing monetization or financial intermediation.   
 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The main argument underlying this study is that actual rates and predetermined targets of 
money growth can be applied as monetary policy indicator variables in the economies 
converging to the eurozone.  Necessary conditions for such application include a full 
completion of the ‘catching-up’ monetization, as well as relatively well established price 
stability.  If these prerequisites are satisfied, a stable, dynamic link between money growth 
and inflation can be observed.  Completion of the monetization process depends on the 
institutional advancement of the financial sector, including financial intermediation, bank 
competitiveness and the overall efficiency of the financial system.  On the other hand, price   15 
stability is a function of improving credibility of monetary authorities, the ability to maintain 
fiscal discipline and the institutional resilience against external and internal inflationary 
shocks. 
   
  The empirical section of this study reaffirms that the link between money, inflation 
and exchange rates is yet to be established in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.  
However, there are some encouraging signs from the VEC tests that at least short-run changes 
in M2 money have some bearing on inflation.    Although it is not plausible to determine 
sensible money growth targets on the basis of the long-run cointegration relationships 
between these variables, policy-makers may consider giving more attention to the actual and 
projected money growth trends.  It is because the above-mentioned transition-related 
processes are believed to be almost completed; therefore, the link between money and 
monetary policy target variables can be expected to become stronger in the future, during the 
period of active convergence to the eurozone. 
 
  In essence, money growth can be utilized as an important indicator variable in the 
preferred monetary policy framework of inflation targeting with a high degree of exchange 
rate flexibility (that is fundamentally consistent with the ERM II system based on a broad 
plus-minus 15 percent band around a central parity rate).  
 
  Moreover, the experience of monetary policies in the examined countries proves that it 
is not always absolutely necessary to establish a considerable degree of monetary stability in 
order to introduce more advanced, autonomous monetary policy regimes.  For instance, 
inflation targeting was introduced in Poland in 1999 in spite of some warnings that such a 
move could be premature.  Among others, Christofferssen and Wescott (1999) claimed that 
Poland was not fully prepared for inflation targeting as the actual inflation could not reach 
single digit levels and interest rates as well as other policy variables were still extremely 
volatile.  Yet, the new monetary policy regime has proven to be very successful in terms of 
containing inflation and generating sustainable stability of key monetary variables (Jonas and 
Mishkin, 2003).  If policy-makers are fully convinced that a new policy regime will be 
successful in the future, their commitment to a new policy strategy is perhaps more critical for 
its overall success than the initial economic instability and institutional imperfections. 
 
  In hindsight, monitoring and targeting money growth is likely to provide useful 
guidance for monetary authorities in the countries aspiring to join the eurozone in the future.  
Information about the actual interactions between the changes in money balances and in 
policy instrument variables (interest rates) can provide valuable signals for projecting the 
degree of achievement of inflation and exchange rate stability targets. REFERENCES  
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Figure 1: Money Velocity and Opportunity Cost of Holding Money: A Dynamic 












NFA = not feasible area, FSEI = financial system efficiency improvement, BCI = bank competition increase
A to B = catching up monetization
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Table 1: Indicators of Money Stability  
 
Poland  Czech Republic  Hungary   
M2V  OCM  IEMD  DoM  M2V  OCM  IEMD  DoM  M2V  OCM  IEMD  DoM 
1992  2.796  6.2    na  35.8  na  Na  na  na  1.761  -1.7  na  56.8 
1993  2.786  -0.8  0.99  35.9  1.463  -0.4  na  68.3  1.804  1.5  1.82  55.4 
1994  2.912  -4.6  1.13  34.3  1.409  -0.1  0.80  71.0  1.943  6.6  1.56  51.5 
1995  2.952  -1.2  1.05  33.9  1.273  0.0  0.61  78.6  1.662  7.6  0.18  60.2 
1996  2.838  0.3  0.86  35.2  1.356  5.1  2.02  73.7  2.078  5.4  2.09  48.1 
1997  2.678  2.2  0.77  37.3  1.430  3.5  4.19  69.9  2.151  3.2  1.19  46.5 
1998  2.507  0.9  0.71  39.9  1.515  2.4  2.74  66.0  2.203  3.4  1.17  45.4 
1999  2.334  1.9  0.60  42.8  1.526  1.2  1.30  65.5  2.146  2.8  0.82  46.6 
2000  2.422  2.4  1.31  41.3  1.373  1.9  0.29  72.8  2.206  1.5  1.24  45.3 
2001  2.216  0.2  0.36  45.1  1.353  2.1  0.86  74.0  2.131  2.4  0.78  46.9 
2002  2.344  -0.5  0.97  42.7  1.324  0.5  0.68  75.5  2.120  1.5  0.96  47.2 
 
Notes: M2V is M2 money velocity (=nomGDP/M2), OCM is the opportunity cost of holding 
money defined as a difference between 3months T-bill rates and the average bank deposit 
rates, IEMD is income elasticity of money demand computed as arc elasticity (% change in 
nominal GDP/ % change in M2 money), DoM is the degree of monetization (M2/nomGDP in 
%). 
 
Source: own calculations based on the data from International Monetary Fund: International 
Financial Statistics – Statistical Yearbook 2003.  
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Table 2: Unit Root Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Results (t values) 
      (January 1995 – December 2003 monthly data)   
 
Variables at their:  Level  1
st Difference  Log 
Poland: 
M2 money 
CPI Inflation (year-on-year) 















CPI Inflation (year-on-year) 
















CPI Inflation (year-on-year) 


















Notes: the asterix indicates stationary series (at 5%); McKinnon critical values are -2.889 at 
  five percent and -3.493 at one percent. For the period preceding the inception of the  
  euro in January 1999, domestic currency values of the German mark times the fixed  
  conversion rate of 1.95583 are applied. 
 
Source: own calculations generated with EViews 4.0, based on The National Bank of Poland, 
The Czech National Bank and The National Bank of Hungary data. 
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Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for M2 Money, Inflation and Exchange 
               Rate in Poland (based on the January 1995-December 2003 sample period) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test. DGP assumptions are: the level data have a linear 
deterministic trend, CEs and test VAR h ave only intercept and no trend, one-to-four lag 






































Notes: Trace statistics are L-R statistics LR(n), they are asymptotically ÷
2(n) variates under 
the null hypothesis H0 . Number of cointegration equations (CEs) is denoted by r. The above 
table presents trace statistics only, maximum eigenvalue statistics are not reported as they 
provide the same results in terms of the number of CEs. 
 
Source: as in Table 2.   
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Table 4: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for M2 Money, Inflation and Exchange  
               Rate in The Czech Republic (January 1995-December 2003 sample period) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test. DGP assumptions are: the level data have no linear 
deterministic trends, CEs have only intercept and no trend, test VAR no intercept, one-to-two 






































Notes: see Table 3.  
 
Source: as in Table 2.   
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Table 5: Johansen Cointegration Test Results for M2 Money, Inflation and Exchange  
               Rate in Hungary (January 1995-December 2003 sample period) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test. DGP assumptions are: the level data have no linear 
deterministic trends, CEs have only intercept and no trend, test VAR has no intercept, one-to-






































Notes: see Table 3. 
 
Source: as in Table 2.   
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Table 6: Estimation Representations of VEC (equation 14) for Cointegrating      
               Relationships Specified for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. 
 
  Poland  Czech Rep.  Hungary 






































































































































































Notes:  AIC denotes the Akaike information criterion, SIC is the Schwartz information 
criterion, standard errors are reported in parentheses and t-statistics in brackets.  
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